ID :
20205
Fri, 09/19/2008 - 18:01
Auther :
Shortlink :
https://oananews.org//node/20205
The shortlink copeid
US has right to respond if India conducts test: US official
Sridhar Krishnaswami
Washington, Sep 19 (PTI) Assuring the law makers that
the "strong package" sent to them based on Presidential
determinations is consistent with the requirements of the Hyde
Act, a top Bush administration official told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that "just as how India had the
sovereign right to test, the United States enjoyed the same
right to respond."
"We have been asked what would happen if India conducts
a nuclear weapons test, and the short answer is that while
India maintains a sovereign right to test, we most certainly
maintain a sovereign right to respond," Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs William Burns told law makers on
the Senate Panel.
"We believe the Indian government intends to uphold the
continuation of the test moratorium it committed to in 2005
and reiterated in its September 5 statement.
"We also believe India will uphold its safeguards
agreement with the I.A.E.A. But Secretary Rice has noted
clearly that we reserve the right to take appropriate action
should India nonetheless resume nuclear testing and, as she
told Congress in April 2006," the senior State Department
official said.
"We've been very clear with the Indians, should India
test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India in an way
violate the I.A.E.A. safeguards agreements to which it would
be adhering, the deal, from our point of view, would, at that
point, be off," Burns pointed out.
The Bush administration official said that the U.S.
had sought a Nuclear Suppliers Group (N.S.G.) exception for
India, consistent with the Hyde Act, and, at the same time,
capable of commanding a consensus within the group.
"The Hyde Act does not require incorporation of its
specific terms and restrictions in the N.S.G. exception, but
we pursued the exception with a careful eye to Hyde Act, and
the result is that it contains no provision inconsistent with
the Hyde Act and that takes account of its terms and
restrictions," Burns told the law makers on the Senate Panel.
On being asked why the U.S. did not support an
automatic termination provision in the N.S.G. by the Senate
Panel, he said "we could not support proposals to
automatically terminate the exception if India tests, because
the Atomic Energy Act gives the U.S. President the statutory
authority to waive restrictions if terminating cooperation
would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S.
non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardise the
common defence and security.
"To do so would have tied the hands of this and every
president to exercise their authority under the act," he said.
On transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology
to India, Burns said "the Hyde Act does not allow for U.S.
transfer to India of such technology, except in very narrowly
limited circumstances.
The administration continues to pursue within the
N.S.G. limitations on such transfers based on appropriate
non-proliferation criteria, he told the Panel and the overflow
hearing room at the Dirksen Building last afternoon.
"We look to the rise of India as an opportunity not
just to share the benefits of the international system, but
also the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining,
strengthening and defending it," the senior State department
official said.
Burns, at the beginning of his presentation, told the
powerful Committee that there were powerful strategic,
environmental, non-proliferation and economic reasons to
support the civilian nuclear initiative.
"Strategically, it reflects the transformation of our
relations and a broad recognition of India's emergence in a
global stage," Burns said.
Terming India as its fastest-growing export markets,
he said it is an abiding American interest to develop a strong
and forward-looking partnership with the world's largest
democracy.
"This civil nuclear initiative is about advancing that
common strategic vision," he said, adding we need to capture
that momentum, locking in the very significant gains that have
been achieved in recent years. We need to establish a platform
on which the next administrations in both countries can build.
Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, John Rood told the law makers that the
Bush administration beleieved that the civilian nuclear
initiative "will have a lasting strategic impact in building a
new strategic partnership with India, reducing India's
dependency on fossil fuels and resulting greenhouse gas
emissions, while, at the same time, strengthening the nuclear
non-proliferation regime"
Rood who answered a lot of substantive and technical
questions during the course of the lengthy hearing assured law
makers that in the process of getting an exemption for India
at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, no side deals were made.
"We achieved consensus because there was a strong
desire among participating governments to find a way to enable
civil nuclear cooperation trade with India, while reinforcing
the global non-proliferation regime. We were able to do both,"
he said.
On the subject of testing and what it entailed for the
United States, Rood said, "in the 123 agreement either party
has the right to terminate the agreement and seek the return
of any transferred materials and technology if it determines
that circumstances demand such action.
Washington, Sep 19 (PTI) Assuring the law makers that
the "strong package" sent to them based on Presidential
determinations is consistent with the requirements of the Hyde
Act, a top Bush administration official told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that "just as how India had the
sovereign right to test, the United States enjoyed the same
right to respond."
"We have been asked what would happen if India conducts
a nuclear weapons test, and the short answer is that while
India maintains a sovereign right to test, we most certainly
maintain a sovereign right to respond," Under Secretary of
State for Political Affairs William Burns told law makers on
the Senate Panel.
"We believe the Indian government intends to uphold the
continuation of the test moratorium it committed to in 2005
and reiterated in its September 5 statement.
"We also believe India will uphold its safeguards
agreement with the I.A.E.A. But Secretary Rice has noted
clearly that we reserve the right to take appropriate action
should India nonetheless resume nuclear testing and, as she
told Congress in April 2006," the senior State Department
official said.
"We've been very clear with the Indians, should India
test, as it has agreed not to do, or should India in an way
violate the I.A.E.A. safeguards agreements to which it would
be adhering, the deal, from our point of view, would, at that
point, be off," Burns pointed out.
The Bush administration official said that the U.S.
had sought a Nuclear Suppliers Group (N.S.G.) exception for
India, consistent with the Hyde Act, and, at the same time,
capable of commanding a consensus within the group.
"The Hyde Act does not require incorporation of its
specific terms and restrictions in the N.S.G. exception, but
we pursued the exception with a careful eye to Hyde Act, and
the result is that it contains no provision inconsistent with
the Hyde Act and that takes account of its terms and
restrictions," Burns told the law makers on the Senate Panel.
On being asked why the U.S. did not support an
automatic termination provision in the N.S.G. by the Senate
Panel, he said "we could not support proposals to
automatically terminate the exception if India tests, because
the Atomic Energy Act gives the U.S. President the statutory
authority to waive restrictions if terminating cooperation
would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S.
non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardise the
common defence and security.
"To do so would have tied the hands of this and every
president to exercise their authority under the act," he said.
On transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technology
to India, Burns said "the Hyde Act does not allow for U.S.
transfer to India of such technology, except in very narrowly
limited circumstances.
The administration continues to pursue within the
N.S.G. limitations on such transfers based on appropriate
non-proliferation criteria, he told the Panel and the overflow
hearing room at the Dirksen Building last afternoon.
"We look to the rise of India as an opportunity not
just to share the benefits of the international system, but
also the burdens and responsibilities of maintaining,
strengthening and defending it," the senior State department
official said.
Burns, at the beginning of his presentation, told the
powerful Committee that there were powerful strategic,
environmental, non-proliferation and economic reasons to
support the civilian nuclear initiative.
"Strategically, it reflects the transformation of our
relations and a broad recognition of India's emergence in a
global stage," Burns said.
Terming India as its fastest-growing export markets,
he said it is an abiding American interest to develop a strong
and forward-looking partnership with the world's largest
democracy.
"This civil nuclear initiative is about advancing that
common strategic vision," he said, adding we need to capture
that momentum, locking in the very significant gains that have
been achieved in recent years. We need to establish a platform
on which the next administrations in both countries can build.
Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security, John Rood told the law makers that the
Bush administration beleieved that the civilian nuclear
initiative "will have a lasting strategic impact in building a
new strategic partnership with India, reducing India's
dependency on fossil fuels and resulting greenhouse gas
emissions, while, at the same time, strengthening the nuclear
non-proliferation regime"
Rood who answered a lot of substantive and technical
questions during the course of the lengthy hearing assured law
makers that in the process of getting an exemption for India
at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, no side deals were made.
"We achieved consensus because there was a strong
desire among participating governments to find a way to enable
civil nuclear cooperation trade with India, while reinforcing
the global non-proliferation regime. We were able to do both,"
he said.
On the subject of testing and what it entailed for the
United States, Rood said, "in the 123 agreement either party
has the right to terminate the agreement and seek the return
of any transferred materials and technology if it determines
that circumstances demand such action.