'Dyfunctional' UN security led to Algiers bombing: panel

Dharam Shourie

United Nations, Oct 9 (PTI) A dysfunctional United
Nations security management system, lack of adequate
supervision, and significant lapses in judgment and
performance played a major role in the 2007 terrorist bombing
on U.N. offices in Algiers in which 17 staff members were
killed, a probe panel has concluded.

The independent panel, which released a summery of its
report Wednesday, blamed politicisation of the security system
for the deadly incident.

Officials explained that aggressive security measures
by the U.N. are resented by the countries as they show they
are insecure, something which no member state wants to admit.

Stating that politicisation seriously compromised the
security, the panel said preoccupation of U.N. security
officials with countries like Afghanistan and Iraq led to
neglect of its offices in Algiers.

"The dysfunction of the present system is not
attributable to a lack of resources alone," the panel said,
recommending administrative action against six individuals and
disciplinary proceedings against four others. "It is also
attributable to a failure on the part of those who designed it
and those who implemented it."

The names of the officials were not released as, a
spokesperson said, they would be subjected to an inquiry to
determine what action should be taken.

The Independent Panel on Accountability, headed by
former U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Legal Affairs
Ralph Zacklin, was set up by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in
June to examine whether any staff should be held individually
accountable for the 2007 attack.

Zacklin told a news conference that an administrative
measure could be something as simple as a letter of reprimand
while a disciplinary action could be something as serious as
dismissal. The panel also recommended an administrative
measure against "an organ of collective responsibility," in
this case the U.N. Security Management Team in Algiers.

The 88-page report, submitted to Ban, has cited a
"marked reluctance" of some of those interviewed to accept the
panel's procedures and methods of work.

The lack of executive authority of the Under Secretary
General of the Department of Safety and Security (D.S.S.) and
the role of the so-called Designated Official responsible for
on-site security were at the root of the design fault of the
system, the panel found.

It said the former official was given responsibility
without authority and the latter was expected to function as
head of security in the field office and as programme manager,
responsibilities which are often inherently contradictory, it
added. Under-Secretary-General David Veness resigned in June,
saying he would shoulder full responsibility for any security
lapse that may have occurred.

Stressing the primary responsibility of the host
country for security of U.N. staff, the report noted that
where relations with that country are strained or
non-existent, "a critical fault-line may develop with tragic
consequences."

Governments must assume their responsibilities fully
if they are to meet expectations inherent in the notion of
primary responsibility, with proper and effective channels of
communication maintained between the country's security
services and the U.N. Security Advisers in the field, it
noted.

"The U.N. needs to urgently review the one-U.N. house
doctrine and the security phase system. The one-U.N. house
doctrine if followed liturgically, it seriously undermines
U.N. security in countries where there are terrorist threats,"
the summary said.

"The security phase system was found by the panel to
have been seriously compromised in Algeria through a process
of politicisation. The system as such was rejected or
questioned by many of those interviewed since it tends to
provide a false sense of security or the appearance of careful
elaboration when in fact it is frequently inconsistent in its
application from country to country."

Zacklin noted the U.N. graded phase system used
worldwide was intended to govern U.N. operations in a country,
not to be a reflection of the security situation there as a
whole.

"In Algeria, but it may be true in many other
countries... many host countries do not look with pleasure on
a security phase in a country being placed at a high level
because for them this indicates that the country is not
secure," he said.

Besides, the report said in there was a lack of
adequate supervision and guidance on the part of senior
managers "which can only be partially excused by the lack of
resources."

"Senior managers were pre-occupied with Afghanistan,
Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia and Sudan. Algeria was not on the radar
screen. During the early and middle part of 2007 when the
situation in Algeria clearly required sustained attention, key
parts of D.S.S. were undergoing personnel changes," it said.