NORTH KOREA NEWSLETTER NO. 58 (June 11, 2009)

*** OPINION FROM EXPERTS

North Korea's Succession Dilemma: Why Dictators Choose Hereditary Succession

By Park Hyeong-jung
(Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul)

Beginning last January, Kim Jong-il's third and youngest son, Kim Jong-un, came
into the spotlight as his father's most likely successor. Some media sources have
reported that North Korea has already taken steps to transition the country's
leadership to the younger Kim in what would become the regime's second
consecutive father-to-son succession. In dictatorial states, hereditary
successions are seen as a means to minimize the dilemma and risk the regime must
face in the process of transferring power from one leader to the next. This is
most likely the reason North Korea has chosen hereditary succession over other
forms of power transition.
What is the dilemma that dictatorial regimes face when it comes to succession?
Mainly, dictators must take on different forms of risk whether or not they decide
to appoint a successor. If a dictator gives too much power to his successor while
preparing for the transition, there is a risk that the successor may overthrow
the dictator or create internal division among the people. On the other hand, if
a dictator does not create a strong foundation of support for his successor or is
unclear about who it will be, there is a high possibility that a power struggle
will break out after the dictator's death. Thus, the inescapable dilemma.
Dictators will have to face risk whether they choose a successor or not.
Moreover, their successor can neither be too strong nor too weak.
One way to manage this dilemma is by transferring power through hereditary
succession. First, father-to-son succession is the surest way of protecting the
current dictator's security. Compared to other forms of succession, hereditary
successors pose the lowest risk of rebelling against the current leader or
attempting to take over at an earlier date. Second, hereditary succession
provides the greatest security for elites who want to maintain the current
distribution of power. If the leader were to choose a successor among the elites,
the distribution of power among various groups within the elites would shift.
This could result in a power struggle among the elites in which one group is
forced out of power, or the whole political system goes into crisis. In contrast,
hereditary succession allows the elites to maintain the status quo. This form of
succession is the option for leaders who do not want their regime to collapse or
factions to purge each other.
According to Jason Brownlee, from the end of World War II to 2006, there has been
a total of 258 cases in which a dictator has ruled a state for more than three
years. Among these figures, there were 23 cases of hereditary succession. Of
those, nine were successful.
Hereditary succession goes against contemporary political thought, so there are
many obstacles that hinder its success. What conditions are necessary for
hereditary succession to be successful? First, the ruler must have founded the
party in power. Or, as in North Korea's case, the dictator's authority must
supersede the party's authority. Second, there must be a precedent of hereditary
succession. This prevents elites from justifying and agreeing on other forms of
power transfer. Elites usually strongly support the successor appointed by the
current leader because they are used to this form of succession. However, if the
current ruler was selected through an appointment process led by the party, there
is a high probability that the elites may oppose hereditary succession.
Historical evidence shows that hereditary successors receive the support of the
elites even when they are relatively young, inexperienced, and unfamiliar with
dictatorial rule. For example, Jean-Claude Duvalier inherited his father's rule
in Haiti in 1971, when he was only 19; Ramfis Trujillo took over the Dominican
Republic in 1961, when he was 32; Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan succeeded his father
in 2003, when he was 42; and Faure Gnassingbe began his rule of Togo in 2005 at
age 39. The reason these young and experienced rulers received the elite's
support was because hereditary succession allowed top officials and elites to
maintain their power and status.
The most important role of hereditary succession is preventing power struggles
among the ruling class and allowing elites to hold on to their power. In other
words, hereditary succession can be seen as a joint project by the current ruler
and the elites to overcome the natural limits of the ruler's lifespan and
maintain the status quo by controlling the uncertainties of power transfer.
The success or failure of North Korea's father-to-son succession hangs on the
regime's ability to deal with its international policy challenges. Hereditary
succession will most likely not increase North Korea's ability to solve these
challenges. Ultimately, the gap between the regime and its people will widen.
From the perspective of comparative politics, in dictatorships like North Korea,
where it is impossible to differentiate between the public and private, the
ruling class has broken apart as a result of protest from the masses.
(END)