(EDITORIAL from the Korea Times on July 23)

Tough, Direct Approach: What Matters Is Mutual Trust ??? As Always

For diplomatic watchers wondering about the Barack Obama administration's North
Korea policy, a hint seems to have just been dropped.

The ``comprehensive package'' concept floated here Monday by Kurt Campbell, U.S.
assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, to lure the
Stalinist country back to the dialogue table, is neither entirely new nor
specific but could represent a major turnaround in policy from previous
administrations.
Officials in both Washington and Seoul are trying not to attach much meaning to
this new ??? and old ??? approach, which promises all the communist country has
wanted, namely diplomatic recognition, security guarantees and economic aid, in a
package once Pyongyang takes ``serious, irreversible'' steps toward
denuclearization. By most signs, however, it is also clear this is not just
another piece of bait.
Assistant Secretary Campbell is no official to be taken lightly in view of both
his rank and experience in North Korea affairs. The reason the Obama
administration is turning to a blanket deal is also far too apparent: all
step-by-step, carrot-and-stick tactics of its predecessors have failed. So
Washington's latest idea seems to be to use only sticks for the time being,
saving the carrots to give all at the same time ??? only when the ``unruly
teenager,'' as Campbell's boss Hillary Clinton described the North, shows true
repentance as well as signs of real change.
Such a presumed tactical change wins additional credence from the reports on the
South Korean government's creation of a $40-billion aid fund for the North with
the help of international lenders. Although foreign ministry officials denied the
report, Cheong Wa Dae apparently didn't want to waste the publicity opportunity,
stressing the comprehensive package idea ``originally came from President Lee
Myung-bak'' during his summit with President Obama. In actuality, exactly the
same contents appeared first in the 1994 Agreed Framework and reappeared in the
Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement ??? albeit in gradual, not simultaneous, form.
Both Presidents Lee and Obama, however, need to ponder why their predecessors
chose to take the time-taking ??? and painstaking ??? gradual, action-to-action
approach: A complete lack of mutual trust between North Korean leaders and its
U.S., South Korean and Japanese counterparts.
From Pyongyang's ??? and an objective third party's ??? viewpoint, there is a
serious asymmetry of risks in the far-reaching, all-embracing deal, because while
the ``irreversible'' disarmament is literally irrevocable, promises can always be
revoked under various pretexts.
Without mutual trust, a comprehensive, simultaneous solution proposal, however
``appealing'' its contents may be as Campbell described, could only appear as
one-sided and even work as ``another pressure'' for the reclusive and incredulous
regime. U.S. officials need to look no further than the complete failure of
President Lee's original proposal to Pyongyang ??? the South would increase the
North's per capita income to $3,000 if the impoverished regime opens and
denuclearizes itself ??? only ending up aggravating the inter-Korean relationship
almost beyond repair.
What's important now is not to try to take the initiative in approaching the
North either in hard-line or soft-line ways, but to regain lost trust through
small but genuine steps forward, including the resumption of interrupted tourism
projects and normalizing the inter-Korean industrial complex.
North Korea is reportedly preparing to propose the resumption of family unions
around the Korean version of Thanksgiving Day in early October. How the Koreas
can cooperate in this and other humanitarian programs will show whether there
still remains some hope for reviving the worst inter-Korean ties in decades.
(END)